This case involved an appeal by the health board against a decision of the Scottish Court of Session that conscientious objection of two practicing Roman Catholic senior midwives to taking part in abortions (permissible under GB legislation) included all processes, including administrative tasks, such as sending out letters, booking in patients, setting staff rotas, supporting staff etc. 

In the opinion of the Court of Session:

"It is consistent with the reasoning which allowed such an objection in the first place that it should extend to any involvement in the process of treatment, the object of which is to terminate a pregnancy." This meant the employees could refuse to carry out the administrative tasks. The Board appealed. 

Allowing the Board's appeal, Lady Hale giving the lead judgement" said:

"... the course of treatment to which the petitioners may object is the whole course of medical treatment bringing about the termination of the pregnancy. It begins with the administration of the drugs designed to induce labour and normally ends with the ending of the pregnancy by delivery of the foetus, placenta and membrane... It is unlikely that, in enacting the conscience clause, Parliament had in mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that might be associated with those acts [made lawful by legislation]."

The Supreme Court goes on to test what and what is not covered by the conscientious clause against a list of tasks that may be required to be undertaken by staff in the labour ward that might involve patients seeking abortions. In essence, it is the "hands-on" duties that can be objected to and begin with administering drugs that will induce an abortion, as set out above. They do not include administration duties, setting rotas for employees on the abortion ward etc. 

Note, however, that this case dealt with the question of the meaning of the words “to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection”. It did not deal with claims of religious discrimination and any reasonable accommodations that an employer might be required to consider under employment legislation, with reference to article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights i.e. the “right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” including the freedom “to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. Article 9 is a qualified right and Ms Doogan and her colleague have extant claims at an employment tribunal. The employees' fight is not over. 
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