Defamation claim successful at a summary point when a former employee posted up social media comments which were not truthful in relation to a former employer.

The defendant had been employed by the first named plaintiff.  The defendant had brought a claim for constructive unfair dismissal from her employment principally in relation to having to wear a mask and/or lanyard relating to the Coronavirus regulations at that time.  The Tribunal dismissed the defendant’s claim. It was also dismissed in relation to reconsideration, a further appeal and in terms of seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Following that court action – the defendant had used her social media accounts to publish material relating to the plaintiffs.  This included points that the plaintiff company had discriminated against the defendant as a disabled woman, that she had been mistreated, that the plaintiffs were dishonest in their evidence.  The defendant also published a distorted version of the company’s registered trademark which incorporated the allegation that the company was a discriminatory employer.

Arising from the social media posts the plaintiffs issued proceedings relating to breach of confidence, breach of undertaking, defamation and breach of copyright. They sought injunctions restraining the defendant’s use of trademarks, publication of confidential documents and restraining publication of defamatory content alongside damages for defamation.

The defendant asserted her rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR and the Court acknowledged that she felt aggrieved by how she had been treated by her employers and the outcome of the legal proceedings.

The defendant argued that the statements she had made were truthful, honest opinion and in the public interest. The plaintiffs argued that this was no more than an attempt to re-litigate matters already considered by the Tribunal.  Their claims related to the content of the social media posts. The issue was whether the defences could be struck out.  The Court however held, despite the nature of the draconian power of strike out, that it had a duty to strike out the plea of truth. They found that it was an abuse of process of the court.  The defence of honest opinion was also struck out with the Court holding that the defendant had asserted that they were ‘factually accurate’ so could not fall into the category of honest opinion.  The defence of public interest also did ‘not get off the ground’. The comments were not reasonable, responsible, fair or accurate.  The defence relating to Article 10 had to be looked at in terms of the balancing exercise of the respective rights.  Those rights being the freedom of expression and the right for the plaintiffs not to be subject to defamatory comments.   On this point, the balance was in the favour of the plaintiffs.  Based on this, the Court held that the claim could be summarily disposed of.  As a result, it was for the defendant to notify the court and other parties if she was willing to make an offer of amends. If not, the plaintiffs could proceed for the court to order summary relief.

The defendant had also published documents obtained by her during the Tribunal hearing.  The tort of breach of confidence is to address the use of the documentation. In this case, the court found that the documentation had been used for a collateral or ulterior purpose and not reasonably for the proper conduct of proceedings. The Court, however, held that it could not rule definitively on the point.

On the final claim of trademark infringement by the alteration of the company’s registered trademark the court found that it was defamatory but could not provide summary relief in relation to trademark infringement. The Court held that the relief given for defamation would be a sufficient remedy for breach of trademark and did not make an order in this regard.

An interesting case relating to non-employment claims but arising out of an employment dispute.   It is important to note that being disgruntled with your employer and being annoyed with the outcome of the Tribunal is not sufficient ground to make public statements which are regarded as being dishonest, incorrect and not in the public interest. The High Court demonstrates here how the summary procedure can be adopted to quicken the process and lead to a quicker result rather than a full hearing on the matter where the is no defence which has a reasonable prospect of success.

You can read the case in full here.